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International mobility of academics has risen over the last few decades, especially
among PhD students and post-docs. This may be the result of deliberate policies to
stimulate such mobility on the one hand and of growing imbalances in academic career
opportunities on the other. The general belief that attracting international talents helps
to ensure that a country plays a leading role in research and innovation, stimulates
countries to develop initiatives to attract international students to doctoral programmes
or to attract researchers who emigrated back to the country of origin. More traditional
intercontinental mobility patterns from the south to the north and the east to the west,
are now paralleled within Europe, where the disparities between countries in terms
of R&D investment and skills shortages increase, related to the economic crisis.
Consequently, brain circulation may easily turn into brain drain, and cultural diversity
may decline. Related policy questions are whether this will unavoidably result in a
(further) concentration of the minds in a limited number of regions or hubs and how
this should be considered from the point of view of quality, competitiveness, diversity,
and the future of the comprehensive research university in Europe.
Introduction: The Changing Global Landscape for Academic Mobility
The recently published global map of the top 500 universities in the world,1 shows the
strong concentration of the proclaimed top universities in a few particular regions:
North America (in particular the east and west coasts of the US), Europe (especially
the north-western part of it), Asia (mostly Japan and China), and some in Oceania
(Australia’s south-east cost). An analysis of the flows of international students and
faculty2 confirms this geography as it displays the global scientific powerhouses
and thus global magnets for academic talent. These hot spots attract the largest
European Review, Vol. 23, No. S1, S70–S88 © 2015 Academia Europæa. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
doi:10.1017/S1062798714000799
concentrations of mobile academics. In particular, the bulk of doctoral education is
provided by relatively few institutions globally. This ability to attract talent from
around the world on a highly competitive basis allows these institutions to further
strengthen their capacity, and as they are propelled through the rankings, also their
reputation. In this sense, the current geography may also be guiding future mobility
and an even stronger concentration may occur between and even within these regions.
In other words, unless extra efforts are made to build capacity elsewhere, the current
mobility flows tend to strongly favour established institutions in a limited number of
world regions.
Yet, such efforts are being made and, as a result, the global (im)balance could be
shifting. In general the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) are aiming to build capacity to match the traditional research centres in
Europe, Japan and the United States. But, until recently, even with these emerging
countries entering the field, research capacity was still highly concentrated in a few
regions. As of 2010 the EU, Japan and US still carried out three quarters of the
world’s R&D. Yet, the rise of new Asian scientific powerhouses could change the
global scene. More Asian governments now view science as integral to economic
growth and consequently develop their science infrastructures. This holds especially
for China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. China’s growth in R&D spending
has been spectacular over the last decade with over 20% annually and it now produces
more academic papers than any country apart from the US.3 The rise of newly
emerging science powerhouses in Asia provokes questions of what the impact will be
on science and, in particular, what a shift of scientific power to Asia would mean for
flows of scientific talent from east to west and for cooperation with Asian partners.
A recent ADB/OECD/ILO report4 suggests such shifts in global flows. The flow of
skilled migration from Asia to OECD countries has grown significantly. In 2011,
Asians accounted for one third of all migrants to OECD countries and more than half
of the recent Asian migrants in OECD countries are highly educated. Students from
Asia count for 52% of all international students in the OECD, although more than
three-quarters of these are concentrated in only four countries: the United States,
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan. However, in recent years, more Asian
countries, in particular China and South Korea, have joined the competition for
global talent. And China has already emerged as the second most important desti-
nation country of Asian students after the United States and the third largest for
international students generally. A recent UNESCO report5 confirms the growing
trend for Asian countries to host internationally mobile students (apart from Japan
and China, also Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan have such policies)
although (still) primarily from other Asian countries.6 The rise of Asian countries
as scientific powerhouses is accompanied by increasing intra-Asian research
collaboration.
The United States, with the largest intake of Asian students and academics, fears a
decline of flows from Asia to its universities and R&D centres. However, the strong
development of undergraduate degrees in Asia still seems to generate more supply for
the US in postgraduate training. For the moment, the US–Asia connection seems to
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remain strong, as is also reflected in international scientific collaboration. This may
for the short-medium term remain the way Asia is building capacity, i.e. sending their
most talented students for graduate training to the US, hoping that they return with
state-of-the-art scientific knowledge. And increasingly stimulating them actually do
so. But do they return? So far the success of China’s ‘sea turtle policy’ is just moderate
and the US is undertaking extra efforts to increase ‘stay rates’.
Europe as a whole has, apart from the United Kingdom, benefited much less from
the inflow of Asian students, as compared with the US. European mobility is mainly
intra-European (over 90% of the mobility of students). A lot and (perhaps too) much
attention has, over the last decades, been devoted to intra-European collaboration.
This is also reflected in a weaker research collaboration between Europe and Asia, as
compared with that between Asia and the US. Does this imply that Europe is being
bypassed by the Asian scientific rise? And what will be the implications of these trends
for the geography of science and innovation beyond Europe’s academic sector, for
instance for the relocation of corporate R&D? Will this affect Europe with its
strongly ageing population and predicted skills shortages (even) more than other
regions?
Why International Academic Mobility is on the Rise
Before we enter into these questions on the changing global landscape for academic
mobility, we first want to take a closer look at the reasons for scientists to migrate and
for countries to be interested in attracting them.
In general it can be said that research is becoming an ever more global activity, as
scientists all over the world can communicate, share data, and travel (from almost all
countries) with unprecedented ease. International mobility of academics has indeed
risen over the last decades, as will be illustrated in the next section. Mobility can be
explained by both push and pull factors, and often a combination of them.
Economic imbalances across countries and regions may push individuals to seek
better academic career opportunities. The OECD7 identified potential increases in
earnings as one of the most important reasons why people migrate. Scientists are
particularly attracted to better science infrastructure and funding, better working con-
ditions and also higher salaries. The decision to leave the home country is thus often led
by the desire to go where ‘good science’ can be achieved. Key reasons why highly skilled
researchers in the IT and biotechnology sectors moved to the UKwere, for example, the
desire to work with ‘leading edge researchers’, ‘state of the art equipment’, and in a
‘meritocratic system’.8 Common language, geographical proximity, and political
tensions may also play a role.9 Auriol et al.10 also found that citizens with a doctorate
mostly go abroad or return for academic reasons or job-related economic factors, rather
than for family or personal reasons. Strong evidence was for instance found in the
decision to go abroad for doctorate holders from Portugal, Turkey, and Spain.
Pull factors for mobility are often provided by deliberate national policies, based
on the general belief that attracting international talents helps to ensure that a
country plays a leading role in research and innovation. Based on this rationale, many
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countries attract international students to doctoral programmes and more generally
aim to attract tertiary-level graduates as knowledge workers. Recently, the trend to
retain international students for employment has been observed in an increasing
range of countries.11 Whereas international students were previously mainly under-
stood as part of temporary migration movements, they are now increasingly seen as a
source of high skilled labour migration. OECD estimates that in about 15–30% of
cases international study is the first step toward eventual settlement in the host
country. In Japan and France, almost half of all new permanent labour migration
comes directly from the study route. It should be noted that this concerns degree
mobility and not students who study abroad only for a part of their degree. The
advantage of a domestic degree, which is more easily understood by employers in the
host country, over short term mobility, which accounts towards a foreign degree,
seems to play a role, in spite of efforts to facilitate international degree recognition.
As student-led migration is becoming part of a global talent contest, international
degree students are thus being approached more often as part of a broader strategy to
promote skills development and mobility. This entails a range of measures including
allowances to work during studies, to change visa status after graduation, or special
job search visas for graduates, allowing international students to work and to seek
employment after graduation in the host country. In this fashion, the European
Parliament adopted in early 2014 a new guideline that allows international students
to work (without restrictions on the number of hours) during their studies and to stay
1.5 years after graduation to search for employment or to start up a company. As part
of such broader strategies, the EU also aims to attract researchers, as facilitated
through the Blue Card policy. In certain cases, countries also aim to attract
researchers who emigrated back to the country of origin (for instance in India and in
China). China introduced a number of financial incentive tools to attract researchers
from abroad. The 1000 Talent Plan provides, under certain conditions, leading
researchers in the domains of science and technology with a substantial lump-sum
subsidy and a research subsidy in addition to the regular salary.
Research provides supporting evidence that diversity in the labour force generally
contributes to entrepreneurship and innovation12 and that productivity is higher in
companies hiring knowledge immigrants.13 Dutch researchers who conducted their
postdoc training at prestigious foreign universities performed for instance better than
those who remained in the Netherlands. The most productive academics, in terms of
referred publications, are those with the most international collaboration, including
co-publication of articles and publishing in a foreign country.14 Franzoni et al.15
found that migrant scientists in the USA on average perform at a higher level than
domestic scientists. These scholars explain the superior performance of migrant
scientists by the so-called ‘mover’s advantage’; mobility allows them to match their
particular knowledge with those of others and to work in places where their specia-
lization is optimally surrounded by complementary resources. They thus concluded
that policies to facilitate immigration for high-skilled human capital and policies
aimed at harmonizing the international job market for research can be beneficial
to science. This evidence would support the policy rationales presented above.
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For Europe, recent research16 revealed that there is great diversity within the aca-
demic labour force in terms of research performance. In fact, a top 10% of ‘European
super elite researchers’ seems to produce almost half of the total research output and
that international orientation and collaboration is the single most important set of
variables predicting their high research productivity. From this study it was
concluded that the role of these top performers is bound to increase, with the growth
of individualized competitive research funding in many countries. With the growth of
individual and portable grants (such as through the European Research Council, see
below) a concentration of these high-performing academics in highly ranked-
institutions would occur, not only leading to growing national research concentration
in selected institutions only, but also that happening at a European level.
Special Focus on International Doctoral Students and the Migration of Post-
docs
Subsequently, we will demonstrate and discuss in more detail that the rise in academic
mobility occurs especially among young researchers in doctoral training (PhD
students) and post-docs. And that in Europe the mobility is mainly intra-European,
while in the USA mainly from Asia.
OECD data17 reveal that while in OECD countries the annual number of
doctorates awarded grew by nearly 40% in the decade to 2008, in China the number
of PhDs awarded grows by around 40% each year. From 1985 to 2005, international
students accounted for the bulk of the growth in science and engineering (S&E)
doctorates in the United States, and the majority were from China. Also, in
Denmark, Finland and Ireland the growth in the number of international PhD
students was stronger than the growth in the number of national PhD students.
Across Scandinavia, the overall number of doctoral degrees awarded grew by 32%
between 2002 and 2011, while the number of PhD’s awarded to international students
increased by 121% in the same period.
Further analyses by OECD18 demonstrates that the mobile PhDs are mostly a
brain gain for OECD countries. International doctoral students make up more than
20% of enrolments in advanced research programmes in Australia, Belgium, Canada,
New Zealand, the United States, and the Nordic countries. And even more than 40%
in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. It is highly probable that a
large proportion of these students are from non-OECD economies.
Analysis of the careers of doctorate holders19 shows that the labour market for
doctorate holders is indeed more internationalised (i.e. a higher share of foreign
born) than that of other tertiary-level graduates. For instance, in European countries
15–30% of doctorate holders had worked abroad in the previous ten years. The fact
that the percentage is higher among more recent graduates, indicates that mobility
may be increasing. This seems to refer in particular to the growing international
mobility of post-docs.
The United States attracts a particularly large number of international doctorate
holders, as indicated above. More precisely, Auriol et al.20 found that there were
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around 610,000 foreign-born doctorate holders in the United States in 2005–2009
representing 27% of the total population of doctorate holders in this country and an
increase of 38% compared with 2000. Close to 100,000 doctorate holders were born in
China, of which 40% have US citizenship. The equivalent numbers for India were
64,000 and 54%. South Korea the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and Chinese
Taipei each have between 20,000 and 30,000 native born doctoral graduates residing
in the United States. However, a variety of indicators, including the number of visa
deliveries, seems to point to a decline in the immigration of foreign scientists and
engineers during the recent economic downturn. This is raising concerns about the
‘stay rates’, especially with respect to the international recipients of doctorates in
science and engineering (S&E). Auriol et al.21 found that recipients of S&E doctoral
degrees had higher stay rates than recipients of degrees in disciplines such as economics
and other social sciences. Doctoral graduates originating from China, India, Iran,
Romania, Russia and the Ukraine also had above-average stay rates. In order to
improve the stay rates, efforts have been undertaken to liberalize visa regulations, to
open employment opportunities, permit postgraduate work, to have easier degree
recognition, to improve cooperation between the universities, governments, and indus-
try, and there have beenmany other initiatives.22 These efforts are quite understandable,
as foreign-born employees in theUnited States represent not only 15%of the work force,
but also one third of all engineers, half of the PhD holders in this sector, and over 60%of
the PhDs awarded in the natural sciences. They also contribute significantly to the most
innovative sectors of the US economy, i.e. to technological innovations and patenting.
There is, for instance, at least one foreign born among the establishers of more than half
of the start-up companies in Silicon Valley in the last decade. Of the patents that have
been established by the top ten universities in the United States, 76% had at least one
submitter who was born abroad. And even one in four Nobel Prizes awarded to
Americans between 1990 and 2000, went to a migrant.23 These immigrants clearly
represent an incredibly important part of the country’s human capital and it is thus clear
why the US has an interest in ensuring that they stay.
These issues are also highly relevant for Europe. However, considerably less
consistent data are available for this group of countries as a whole. However, data for
the Nordic countries indicate for instance that more than half (54%) of the foreign
PhD graduates in these countries did not stay in the country where they had earned
their doctorates.24 Below we will take a closer look at the situation in Europe.
First, we turn to the critical debate related to the growing imbalance of global
flows of researchers. As stated above, there are a number of push and pull factors that
influence doctoral and post-doctoral mobility, and although mobility decisions are
often complex, they are also often influenced by the quality of science labour markets
in home and potential host countries, as well as by the reputation of host institutions
or research groups. Clearly, a particular range of mainly OECD countries is very
successful in attracting talent from around the world, which allows these countries to
further strengthen their R&D capacity and the reputation of their institutions. This
seems to result in an even stronger concentration within and consequently more
uneven situation between regions.
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Intermezzo: A Critical Debate on Increasing Global Imbalances
This increasingly uneven situation obviously raises concern and fuels the ongoing
debate about the brain drain – brain gain or brain circulation. Altbach,25 for instance,
argues that the flow of international doctoral students represents a subsidy of the
developing countries to the west. He states that:
There is wide agreement in Europe and North America that new initiatives to entice
the ‘best and brightest’ of professionals from other countries, whom they educate, to
stay and join the local labor force are a good idea […] There is absolutely no recog-
nition of any contradiction between, for example, Millennium Development Goals,
which stress the necessity for educational development in the emerging nations and
policies aimed at attracting the best brains from developing countries […] Until
universities in developing countries offer the academic culture and facilities that top
academics expect—including academic freedom, unrestricted information access,
and laboratories—they will be unable to attract and retain top academic talent, but
the policies of the rich countries certainly do not help.
Also the Council of Doctoral Education of the European University Association26
has a critical stance towards the uneven global flows of researchers:
A diverse, worldwide research system has many benefits but it must not result in work
being concentrated in a few global hubs […] A more globalised and more diversified
research setup will provide more opportunities for research collaborations and will
widen the pool of talent. A bigger and more culturally diverse set of researchers can
only be a benefit to all.
While others argue that this process should be considered as brain circulation, rather
than as a matter of brain drain and brain gain. Gardner27 for instance states that:
Today, migration among elites is increasingly being viewed as a circular process of
migrating to and from or on to another country. This is a process that both indus-
trialised and developing countries can benefit from.
Franzoni et al.28 support this view on the basis of their research:
Our findings that the positive effects of migration persist having controlled for
selection, suggest that brain migration is not a zero-sum gain, in the sense that the
benefits that accrue to the destination country do not necessarily come at the expense
of the sending country, and that there are conversely positive externalities to be
gained by promoting mobile scientists to work with domestic scientists.
Whether or not this process is considered circular, a zero-sum game, or rather not, will
strongly depend on the perspective and aims of the particular stakeholder(s). The fact is
thatmost researchers are free to move across borders and to seek to enhance their career
opportunities beyond the national system and even globally, with the resultant benefits
for a relatively small number of countries and institutions. But also that the current
geography of global scientific powerhouses and magnets for academic talent may be
changing as a result of newly emerging science capacities and infrastructure in Asia in
particular. At the same time, categories such as developed or developing countries have
shifted considerably in the last decade, as witnessed by the pressures around the repre-
sentation of BRICS countries in international organisations such as the IMF and the
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World Bank. It is clear that the global competition is rising. And also that international
student mobility is increasingly considered as part of that competition agenda, whereas
it was for long, and especially in Europe, mostly considered part of the cooperation
paradigm (as analysed by Huisman and Van der Wende29). In many countries and not
long ago, status changes of international students were often prohibited, sometimes to
protect the domestic workforce against competition, but more often, in particular those
from developing countries, to avoid a brain drain. This perspective is changing and
some specific tools have been developed to facilitate the study-to-work transition of
international students.30
A Closer Look at Europe: The Quantitative Dimension
What are the implications of these trends for Europe, where they play out in com-
bination with the severe consequences of the global economic crisis, the resulting
European currency crisis, and the demographic trend of an ageing population?
The current European labour market is facing a quite disappointing situation with
high unemployment (11% of the labour force in EU27 in 2013) and with particular
risks for the youth (23% on average, but with peaks over 50% in the south) and the
low skilled.31 At the same time some two million vacancies remain unfulfilled, mostly
in professional, scientific, and technological areas, including 800,000 researchers and
700,000 ICT specialists. After finance and sales professionals, the most frequently
reported shortages concern biologists, pharmacologists, medical doctors and related
professionals such as nurses, ICT computing professionals and engineers. These
mismatches between the supply of skills and the needs of the labour market are
stronger in some countries (e.g. Lithuania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland)
than in others (e.g. Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands).32 At the same time,
students continue to enrol in studies leading to high unemployment fields. Their
decisions do not perfectly anticipate their future labour market perspectives, parti-
cularly when economic conditions change so rapidly.33
Morehouse34 notes that Europe is indeed in a state of transition and in a state of
paradox: while it has a youth talent surplus in 2013 (the unemployed youth, see
above), it will be facing widespread talent shortages in 2030. More than 45 million
employees may need to be added by then. Skills shortages and mismatches are thus
very real challenges; within a decade there will be a negative balance between supply
and demand for talent in at least 12 European countries, among which its largest
economies.
The European Commission35 estimates that a net increase of even one million
researchers is needed over this decade. Again a mismatch seems to play out; while
Europe has many talented and skilled researchers, and the total head count exceeds that
of the US, Japan and China, they account for a significantly lower share of the labour
force than is the case in the US and Japan. The Commission also states that without
more researchers and an open labour market for researchers, Europe cannot remain
globally competitive. Morehouse, however, argues that enhancing EU-mobility will
only be a short term solution, as the global working-age population will mainly be
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non-European by 2050. In particular, China is expected to be a strong competitor for
skills by mid-century.
In Europe, the existing mismatch between supply and demand may further
increase as a result of uneven trends. First, Cedefop36 estimates that the demand for
high-skilled labour will grow between 2010 and 2020 by almost 16 million. Most
projected increases are expected for high-skilled professionals (such as physical,
mathematical and life-science engineers, health and teaching professionals) and
technicians and associate professionals (including physical, engineering, life science,
health and teaching associate professionals). These two categories are also expected
to hold the highest potential for job creation in the next decade (2.7 million and 4.5
million respectively).
Also, according to Cedefop, this trend is paralleled with an increase in the supply
of high qualifications as a proportion in the labour force of the EU27 (from 15.6% in
2000 to 26.6% in 2020).
However, further elaboration of Eurostat data37 shows that the picture is more
complicated. First, it is important to distinguish between jobs (occupations) and skills
(qualifications). For jobs at aggregate level, a pattern of polarization seems to emerge
with more jobs being created at upper and lower levels within the traditional
hierarchy of jobs, and stagnation or even a decrease of new jobs at medium levels.
Cedefop38 also acknowledges this trend towards polarization on the labour demand
side for Europe (as does the OECD for a wider range of countries). However, on the
supply side the trend is towards a linear up-skilling of the population. Depending on
the speed of these changes, there is a risk that in some countries a skills mismatch
problem will arise or increase. This vertical mismatch can be of two types: over-
qualification or unfilled demand.
Second, Cedefop data indicate that although all EU countries will be increasing
the share of high qualifications in their labour force, no convergence among countries
is expected soon, because those countries with already high levels will move further
ahead, while others are still catching up from a lower level. Consequently, the vertical
mismatch may emerge more in certain countries than in others. As noted by various
scholars,39 this creates a risk of an exodus of high-skilled workers from countries
where unemployment is high to countries where jobs are available. Such ongoing
migration potentially serves as a ‘brain drain’ on countries where investment in R&D
is low, concentrating the highly skilled and talented in the countries of Europe with
well-developed research infrastructure and high R&D investment levels. This may
harm the economic growth of countries losing graduates, while increasing disparities
among European countries.
Cynically or not, this type of uneven mobility seems to be further enhanced by EU
certain measures. Not only may enhancing EU-mobility only be a short-term solution
(as argued above), it also seems to contribute to increasing the disparities between
countries. A striking example is the generous and highly competitive grants awarded
by the European Research Council (ERC). Teixeira40 suggests that they seem to
enhance the pattern of winners and losers, as relatively few researchers from Central
and Eastern Europe and from southern Europe gain these grants. Moreover, those
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who win are free to take the grants to a location of their choice. As a result, strong
countries, such as the UK, Germany and Switzerland, are boosted further. These
conclusions are confirmed by Zecchina,41 who found that country performance in the
ERC is indeed diverging since the ERC’s start in 2007, whereby a few countries are
big net importers of research talent (notably the UK and Switzerland) or research
grant moneys (the UK and the Netherlands). This is of course relative to the
outbound mobility of their national researchers (Germany and Italy have a lot of
nationals who moved elsewhere with their ERC grants) and to the national
contribution to the ERC through the EU (here the UK and the Netherlands have the
largest surpluses, followed by Sweden, Belgium and Austria, while almost all other
countries demonstrate a deficit, with the largest for Italy, followed by Germany,
Spain, and France). Considering the above-noted phenomenon, the ‘European super
elite researchers’may be expected to become increasingly in demand and thus mobile
and contributing to these uneven flows and a resulting growing concentration of
minds in Europe.
A Closer Look at Europe: Illustration by Country Case Studies
As said before, these mobility trends concur in Europe with movements of individuals
driven by the global economic and resulting European currency crisis. The following
short country examples42 will illustrate this.
Countries in the south of Europe suffer probably from the biggest loss of talent.
For instance 73% of individuals leaving Greece now have a postgraduate degree, 51%
a PhD, and most have studied abroad in some of the world’s best universities. The
dominant destinations of current emigrants from Greece are the UK (31%), US
(28%), and Germany. Italy loses many highly skilled too, mainly to the US (34%),
UK (26%), and France (11%). The main reasons being a lack of research funding
and better economic conditions and career opportunities abroad. From Spain in
particular, many foreign PhD holders seem to move on, as it is difficult for them to
integrate into the academic working force due to academic inbreeding, job adver-
tisements being in Spanish, etc.
A study carried out in central and eastern European countries by the Economic
and Social Research Council43 found that the majority of respondents wanted to do
good science and to be able to work effectively in their chosen field. However, for
science research areas requiring large or expensive equipment, doctoral candidates
often face a lack of opportunity for practical work in their home country. So many
sought to move because of poor working conditions in their home countries and
better conditions abroad. Even short-term mobility is attractive in terms of contacts
with devoted researchers from abroad and with modern equipment as well as the
prospect of better payments in terms of fellowships during scientific visits. It was even
said that Bulgarian salaries of young scientists in higher education and research
cannot attract any gifted and bright students.
The disparities are not necessarily regionally clustered, as is demonstrated for
instance by the UK and Ireland, the former being a big net importer of talent and
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research funds (see above), while the latter has lost a great number of its highly
educated workforce over the last few years. Here, the diverse impact of the economic
and currency crisis has played a role.
However, specific national policiesmay have a different impact, as is demonstrated in
the Nordic countries. Although these are economically strong countries (and not
severely affected by the crisis), with the highest GDP percentages investment in R&D in
Europe, more than half (54%) of the foreign PhD graduates in the Nordic countries do
not stay. And although the Nordic countries have well-connected science systems, the
scientific mobility patterns seem to vary here to some extent. Sweden was steadily
increasing its share of foreign students, which make now up 40% of all people starting a
PhD and even 60% in STEM fields. But concerns about a decrease in these numbers are
due to the recent introduction of tuition fees for students from outside Europe.
In Denmark the risk is recognized that Denmark’s universities are increasingly
delivering highly qualified personnel to other countries and are becoming a net
exporter of PhDs. Addressing these concerns, a broad governmental initiative was
recently launched to attract highly qualified workers to the country with tax benefits,
to fast-track employment and simplify immigration measures, and to attract and
retain international PhD and masters students from outside the EU with tuition fee
exemptions and study grants. The initiatives are backed by a general boost on the
internationalization of Danish higher education, which resulted in an 11% increase in
international degree students between 2011 and 2012.44
Finland is also strongly internationalizing its research career system by, at the
same time, seeking placements abroad for PhD graduates and recruiting senior
researchers from abroad. Both measures are considered vital for increasing the
attractiveness of research careers in this small economy.
Norway is an even more special case. It recruits foreign doctoral students for pro-
grammes with a contractual obligation to return to the home countries (no
perspective to stay). Training themwithout charging high tuition fees is considered by the
government as a ‘pay-back’ for the thousands of Norwegian students who studied
abroad in previous periods. Yet Norwegian industry relies on foreign graduates to fill
many of its job vacancies, especially for positions in energy research. Universities feel
that as long as applicants fromNorway can enter the sector directly with anMSc degree
and until industry recognizes the importance of a PhDby providing extra incentives, they
will not be able to recruit the most talented Norwegian MSc candidates for a doctorate.
Finally, consider two small countries in different parts of Europe and with very
different geographies: Switzerland and the Netherlands. Both demonstrate very
strong research records (in the global top three producers of research) and importers
profiles. In Switzerland, the percentage of international PhDs students has more than
doubled (from 25% to nearly 52% in 2012) over the last two decades. In the same
period the absolute number of all PhDs has also almost doubled (from 11,588 in 1992
to 22,716). Seventy-six percent of the foreigners are European, with about half
of them coming from neighbouring countries such as Germany, France and Italy.
The country’s multilingualism is seen to help to attract foreign students and staff, who
have a particularly strong representation in STEM fields. Immigration rules are keys
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for these small and very open countries with a high level of scientific activity. In this
respect, the February 2014 referendum on immigration in Switzerland obviously
raises great concerns among the leading research and science centres, since the
international dimension of Swiss research has been such an important factor in its
success so far. The EU’s almost immediate response, by excluding the country from
the Erasmus + and Horizon 2020 programmes, confirmed the seriousness of the
issue. Switzerland will have to finance its participation in these programmes for both
outgoing and incoming student mobility, and also negotiations for research mobility
and cooperation are put on hold. As well as the short-term uncertainty for students,
this raises severe concerns about the long-term impact on research. Perhaps quota
arrangements will provide a way out.
In the Netherlands, the proportion of international PhDs (as employed by the
universities) has also strongly increased over the last few years, from 35% in 2006 to
45% in 2010. Sixty percent of them are from Europe, 25% from Asia and Oceania,
and 10% fromNorth America. Also, here they are particularly well represented in the
STEM fields, they make up more than 50% of all PhDs at technical universities. By
attracting so many, the country is in part compensating for low domestic interest in
STEM fields and a loss of brains to the US, the UK and, presumably, Germany,
where investments in R&D have been much stronger over the last few years. The
Netherlands is perceived to have a most liberal immigration policy for knowledge
workers, despite the rise of xenophobia from the political developments of the last
decade. Yet, criticisms arose over the criteria for the immigration of knowledge
workers related to the ranking position of the universities where they obtained their
graduate degree and on particular restrictions that were set on access to nuclear
research facilities (for Iranian PhD students for instance). In a recent report to the
Dutch government, the WRR45 suggested further steps towards ‘a learning econ-
omy’. It is argued that as a small and open economy, the Netherlands has greater
benefits from external than from domestic R&D and could thus choose to become a
‘knowledge importer’, specializing in applying knowledge produced elsewhere rather
than primarily doing so itself. It stresses the concept of knowledge as a global public
good, although no ‘free riding’ would be envisaged. Instead, it would require a great
absorption capacity and a focus on the importance of more dynamic knowledge
infrastructure and networks. Prerequisites would heavily draw on stronger education
paradigms, including innovative practices in higher education. Although imple-
mentation is so far unclear, there may be some similarity with the rationales under-
pinning Norway’s choice to decrease fundamental research.
From this mostly quantitative analysis of research mobility in Europe, it seems
that the traditional intercontinental mobility patterns, i.e. from the south to the north
and the east to the west, are now paralleled within Europe. And also that the
disparities between countries in terms of R&D investment and skills imbalances
increase as a result of both the global economic crisis and certain EU measures.
Consequently, the European open labour market for research with envisaged brain
circulation may easily turn into a brain drain – brain gain situation. This raises a set of
policy questions for Europe.
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A Closer Look at Europe: The Qualitative Dimension
Some light should be shed on the qualitative dimensions of the skills needed for
research and innovation in Europe.
In July 2013, the EU ministers responsible for research and innovation gathered
for an informal meeting under the Lithuanian presidency. Their discussion focused
on the question of what skills are needed for science and innovation in the 21st
century, inspired by the proposed large budgets for the sector (€80 billion under the
Horizon 2020 initiative) that were later that year agreed by the European Parliament.
The insights presented by experts (the author among them) revealed that skills
mapping is a complex matter in general and even more so for research and innovation
in particular. Not least as this concerns by and large skills for future jobs that still
have to be discovered and created.
European reports analyse that methodological and data issues complicate the mod-
elling of skills demands. They require better and more detailed data than presently
available at pan-European level.46 Forecasting skills need is further complicated by the
fact that the views of employers’ and employees’ representatives widely differ, as do
those of scientific experts. Although the overall expectation of a future skill shortage is
now almost common sense, its size and especially its structure remain much contested
and uncertain. Even the increase in higher education qualifications as a solution on the
supply side is contested, as it is said that the crucial skills (such as soft and personal skills,
see below) are basically acquired at early age and school levels.47 Moreover, the
relationship between educational mismatches and mismatches in acquired and required
skills for the labour market seems to differ remarkably per country. It is also widely
agreed that globalization and technological change are major driving forces, but there is
discussion about how exactly. There are, for instance, both trends of outsourcing from
and re-shoring of industrial R&D activities to Europe, diverging views on the impor-
tance of manufacturing for Europe, and on the question of whether ICT replaces
or creates jobs. Demography remains a major predictor, but the impact of recent
(crisis-related) patterns in birth rates is still unclear as is whether the greatly under-
exploited female potential for research and innovation can be activatedmore effectively.
Skills mapping for research and innovation is even more complicated, as analysed
by the OECD.48 First of all, the definitions of both skills and innovation are rather
broad. Innovation can, for instance, be understood on a range from science-based
discovery to more simple adoption of existing innovations. Secondly, there is the
difficulty of measuring human capital and innovation outputs and outcomes.
Empirically, some loose links between skills and innovation have been detected,
leading to only very general insights. In addition, the required levels of attainment
(e.g. technical qualifications or advanced research degrees) are not always clear.
Consequently cautions against simple ‘more-is-better’ policy prescriptions are justi-
fied. Instead, policies to encourage skills for innovation and research may need to be
broad, as a mix of many different skills seems to be relevant.
The broad mix of skills needed in innovative societies and sectors has been
described in terms of eight key competences by the European Commission49 and
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categorized in broader clusters by, for instance, Trilling & Fadel50 and the OECD.51
Besides the more traditional skills, i.e. basic skills (literacy and numeracy), academic
skills (associated with subject matter areas), and technical skills (knowledge of certain
tools and processes, usually specific for an occupation), there is an increasingly strong
focus on the so-called ‘21st century skills’. These may refer to generic and soft
(personal) skills in areas such as problem solving, thinking critically and creatively,
ability to learn and to manage complexity, work in multidisciplinary teams,
communicating across cultures, foreign languages, ‘digital-age literacy’ skills – ICT
literacy, creativity and design skills, leadership, managerial and entrepreneurial skills,
team building and steering, coaching and mentoring, lobbying and negotiating,
co-ordination, ethics, charisma, and so on.
This is a very broad, and still to some extent ambiguous, set of skills indeed and it
may be difficult to pinpoint the essential features. Employers seem to like all
categories almost equally,52 indicating that they may (still) be looking for the perfect
all-rounder. However, Avvisati et al.53 argue on the basis of both employer and
employee data from relevant sectors, that there may not be one ideal type of graduate
or employee, but that innovation is in fact served by contributions from a wide range
of disciplinary backgrounds and suggest that fostering skills for innovation could
(thus) be an objective of any higher education programme. They generally call for a
broader focus of innovation policies, then those traditionally limited to science and
engineering graduates, although their data also demonstrate that those are still
among the most likely to have a highly innovative job.
The most important aspect of these discussions seems to be the growing under-
standing and recognition of both the traditional and the 21st century skills instead of
a polarized either-or debate; and more precisely to acknowledge the particular virtue
of graduate profiles that combine strong STEM skills with 21st century (or soft) skills
at the same time. As an ideal mix, this cannot be claimed to be really novel, however,
as it goes back to C.P. Snow’s54 plea in the late 1950s to overcome the gap between
the humanities and the sciences and even long before that to the liberal arts model,
including both the literary and the mathematical arts. This model was at the origin of
the European university and has a renewed value and strong potential for the 21st
century, as is already demonstrated in some particular initiatives in Europe.55
These include examples such as the Dutch university colleges and other innovative
liberal arts and science initiatives in Europe, as well as other efforts for interdisciplinary
training. However, it is still only a minority of higher education programmes and
institutions that provide for the combined training of this skills mix, due to the mostly
rigid disciplinary structure of the European universities.
Conclusions, Policy Questions and Implications
It is clear that both the global competition and the international academic mobility in
science and research is rising. Within this context, Europe faces quantitative skills
shortages, including an estimate of between 800,000 and one million researchers.
Within Europe, skills imbalances and mismatches increase, with a growing
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divergence between countries and regions, in particular between the North and
South, in terms of their ability to invest and attract human and financial capital for
R&D. As a result, intra-European mobility is not only on the rise, but may easily turn
from an intended brain circulation into a brain drain – brain gain situation. From a
qualitative perspective, solutions to the skills shortages and imbalances relevant to
science and innovation require the training of a broad mix of skills, which is catered
for only in a minority of European higher education institutions and programmes.
Related policy questions and implications refer first of all to whether the intra-
European flows of human and financial capital for R&D will result in a (further)
concentration of the minds in a limited number of regions or hubs in Europe and
whether this should be considered as (un)avoidable or (un)desirable. It seems to be
most likely that this is indeed happening. However, these forces play out quite
differently across the various disciplinary fields. In general the ‘STEM fields’
(including engineering, natural, life and medical sciences) are already most inter-
nationalized, and their experimental branches require the highest concentration of
financial and human resources for large-scale and high-tech research infrastructure.
Consequently, research in these fields will most likely become even more con-
centrated in a limited number of European centres or hubs, such as CERN or a
possible EIT 2.0 model. Research in the social sciences and humanities is likely to
remain more distributed and can stay more rooted in the national context, while
being increasingly networked at European and international levels.
Such a development can, on the one hand, be seen as a further move towards the
required critical mass and efficiencies of scale. In all, an efficient macro-level solution
and effective European-level response to global competition, in terms of strengthen-
ing European cooperation for enhanced global competitiveness. In that sense one
could argue that the open European labour market is actually functioning for
researchers as intended in its outset, by offering them better career opportunities, that
European-level competitiveness is positively on the rise and that a positive impact on
the quality of research can be expected on the basis of the ‘mover’s advantage’ i.e. the
above average performance of a migrant scientist, as evidenced in the USA (see
above). As such, the identified ‘European super elite researchers’ could be expected to
become more concentrated in highly ranked-institutions across Europe, which would
enhance the global competitive position of these institutions. However, this would
not only imply the recognition of increasing diversity between countries in terms of
performance, but also the (further) acknowledgement of a shift from the traditional
European cooperation paradigm (as described by Huisman and van der Wende56) to
the competition paradigm, including accepting the latter as an internal European
logic and reality.
Yet, the acceptance of geographical concentration of science and research in
Europe cannot only be analysed from an economic perspective or from the point of
view of the European Union as a free market of minds, since it will also imply a
concentration of minds in social and cultural terms. As argued by Corbett,57 the
situation in Europe as a collection of states is more complex in any assessment of
national as opposed to collective European benefits. Therefore, the social and cultural
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conditions and impact should also to be taken into account. It can obviously be
argued that the increased scientific mobility provides opportunities for further inte-
gration, cultural exchange and understanding for those involved. But there is a
broader interest for these objectives, and therefore it is important to preserve the
universities’ social-cultural meaning both in the national and European context. This
certainly belongs to their mission, but it should be acknowledged that this con-
centration puts the classical model of the comprehensive European university under
pressure.
As argued above, the current combination of mobility and funding flows and
trends seems to cause an increasing concentration of especially high-tech research
capacity (in the natural and life sciences) in a limited number of regional hubs, which
is likely at the detriment of the broad comprehensive profile of universities in certain
weaker regions and countries. These may have to choose more specialized profiles,
focusing more on less (human and financial) capital-intensive fields in the social
sciences and the humanities. This may be in line with what has been discussed
extensively in the higher education literature (by Clark Kerr, Bob Clark and others),
i.e. that the comprehensive university model is not fit for all contexts and that spe-
cialized universities are likely to find change easier than comprehensive ones. This
may not only lead to less comprehensive profiles, but also urge a rethinking of how to
sustain the Humboldtian values around the teaching-research nexus in various fields
and at the different levels.
In any case, the ongoing Bologna process and future higher education agenda will
be enriched by a recognition of the need for more differentiation. This should include
a general enhancement of the basis by innovating the undergraduate level, allowing
for training in a broad mix of skills, followed by more selective pathways to graduate
research degrees, with continued attention for interdisciplinary approaches and
generic and transferable skills up to the level of doctoral education. Also in this
respect, the traditional European model of the university, with its overly disciplinary
fragmentation, often reflected not only in internal structures, but also in its incom-
patible professional and academic cultures, is being challenged. New avenues will
require strong leadership, revised governance structures, and enhanced institutional
autonomy.
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